Router vulnerability note - MikroTik
MikroTik accepted RSA signatures it should not have, and its trust store has an e=3 root
What happened
cert.pl published a family of cryptographic problems in RouterOS in September 2026, and this is the one that ends up in every conversation we have about certificates. RouterOS accepted malformed RSA/PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures across its RSA-based services, including X.509 validation and SSH host-key authentication. On its own that is a serious parsing bug; combined with a trust store that contains a root CA using the public exponent 3, it becomes a way to forge a trusted intermediate and therefore to mint a certificate for any hostname.
The consequence is the one people find hardest to explain to a client: the router will believe a server that is not the server, as long as the attacker can sit in the path of an outbound TLS connection. The fix arrived in 7.23.6 for the long-term branch and 7.24.3 for stable, and — this is the part to remember — the earlier 7.23.4 and 7.24.2 releases contained an incomplete fix. Upgrading to a version with the right number is not the same as upgrading.
Who is affected
RouterOS 7.x, with the correction present only in 7.23.6 and 7.24.3 at the time of writing.
Check it yourself
Version, channel, and what it believes
[admin@router] > /system package print where name=system
0 system 7.24.2 stable <- incomplete fix
[admin@router] > /certificate print where name~"le"
0 name: letsencrypt-e1
key-size: 2048
[admin@router] > /tool fetch url=https://api.mikrotik.com check-certificate=yes
(an 'SSL: invalid certificate' after upgrading is a trust-store question, not a bug)
Do this
- Upgrade to 7.23.6 or newer on long-term, 7.24.3 or newer on stable; if you are on 7.23.4 or 7.24.2, upgrade again.
- Re-validate certificate checking after the upgrade, because behaviour tightens and old scripts notice.
- Re-check SSH host-key pinning on jump hosts you connect to from the router.
- If the router fetches from an internal CA, confirm that CA's signature parameters; e=3 is where the fun starts.
How we handle it
This is the entry we send when a customer says 'we already upgraded'. Patch-level detail is exactly what the audit's firmware section is for, and it is the reason we keep a CVE list per model rather than per brand.
Sources
- NVD record
- cert.pl: RouterOS CVE
- cert.pl: actively exploited
- MikroTik September 2026 notice
- On the incomplete 7.23.4 fix