Router vulnerability note - MikroTik
MikroTik Winbox answers differently for real usernames
What happened
In February 2025 MikroTik published 6.49.18 for the long-term branch and described a fix for an information leak in the Winbox service. The mechanism is small and typical: connect with a username that exists and the response is a slightly different size than with one that does not. Nothing is bypassed, but an attacker no longer has to guess — they can list your accounts.
That matters more than the CVSS score of 5.4 suggests, because username enumeration is the multiplier on a weak
password. Combined with a Winbox port that is reachable from the internet and a user called admin, the
"medium" bug is the one that turns a login attempt into a guessable half of the credential.
Who is affected
Long-term 6.43.13 through 6.49.13, stable 6.43 through 7.17.2. Fixed in 6.49.18 and in the 7.x builds that followed.
Check it yourself
Version, service, and the accounts it will hand out
[admin@router] > /system package print where name=system 0 system 6.49.13 long-term [admin@router] > /ip service print where name=winbox 6 winbox 8291 0.0.0.0/0 yes [admin@router] > /user print 0 admin 1 office 2 installer
Do this
- Upgrade to 6.49.18 or later on the long-term branch.
- Restrict Winbox by address; the enumeration is worth nothing if only your office can reach 8291.
- Rename or disable the accounts a scanner can guess, and delete the installer when the installation is done.
- Use a password a wordlist will not find, since the username is now known.
How we handle it
Every February since, we send the monitored sites a one-page note: this is the month the 6.48/6.49 crowd usually learns something. For everyone else, this entry is the reason the audit mentions the word 'enumeration'.