Router vulnerability note - MikroTik
MikroTik VXLAN: the remote end did not have to be who you configured
What happened
A VXLAN tunnel is a private corridor between two known addresses. ZDI found that RouterOS did not always check the source address of incoming VXLAN traffic against the configured remote value, so packets from elsewhere could enter the tunnel and, through it, the internal network segments riding on top. No authentication is required to exploit it, which is exactly the wrong property for an overlay that people treat as trusted.
VXLAN on MikroTik is not exotic any more: it shows up whenever someone with two sites and a VPS decides that stretching a VLAN is easier than routing between them. Those installations are usually documented in the memory of one person, which is how we know.
Who is affected
RouterOS with VXLAN interfaces, particularly multi-site setups over the public internet.
Check it yourself
Do you have a VXLAN, and what does it trust?
[admin@router] > /interface vxlan print # NAME VNI REMOTE SOURCE 0 vxlan1 10 203.0.113.7 192.0.2.42 [admin@router] > /interface print where type=vxlan [admin@router] > /ip firewall filter print where in-interface=vxlan1 (no rule here is the interesting answer)
Do this
- Patch to a build newer than the advisory.
- Filter what may enter the tunnel, as you would filter a WAN: VXLAN is not automatically inside.
- Do not put management or servers on the same VNI as guests, for the usual reason.
- If a VPS is the hub, treat its IP as a dependency and note it in the config comment.
How we handle it
Overlays are the part of a remote session we ask most questions about, because the failure is never 'the router is down' but 'the site two kilometres away is down'. If your setup includes VXLAN or EoIP, mention it in the first mail and we will budget for it.