Router vulnerability note - MikroTik
MikroTik REST API: a buffer overflow behind /rest/ip/address/print
What happened
The REST endpoint of RouterOS is the friendly face of the box: /rest/ip/address/print answers
with JSON, and a monitoring system that asks a question in the wrong shape could make parse_json_element
in libjson.so write past a buffer. The attacker needs to reach the REST service, which is the same
service a script somewhere is probably reaching from the internet right now.
The disclosure trail here is worth quoting, because it is the everyday version of vendor response: the reporter got exploit code published, MikroTik answered that the bug tracker says it is fixed and that an update would come. 7.20.1 and 7.21beta2 carry it. Nothing sinister, just the reason we tell customers not to run the REST service on a public interface while they wait for a version they like.
Who is affected
RouterOS 7.x with the REST API enabled, before 7.20.1.
Check it yourself
Is REST on, and where does it listen?
[admin@router] > /ip http-service print
rest-api: yes
[admin@router] > /ip service print where name~"www"
7 www 80 0.0.0.0/0
8 www-ssl 443 ::
[admin@router] > curl -s http://127.0.0.1/rest/ip/address/print | head
Do this
- Upgrade to 7.20.1 or newer.
- Turn REST off if nothing uses it:
/ip http-service set rest-api=no. - If a collector uses it, bind it to the collector's address.
- Prefer the API or SSH for automation from outside the box; the HTTP services are the ones that get scanned.
How we handle it
Our monitoring pull uses the API rather than the web interface where the device allows it, which is a small reason the CVE list for monitoring customers is a shorter read.